• What are the trends regarding the number of IPOs? Has there been a sustained decrease in the number of U.S. IPOs? What does the data show? o Virtually uniform agreement there has been a sustained decrease -see chart below.
• What do academic studies tell us about the trends and their causes?
o My own research • "The Choice of IPO Versus Takeover: Empirical Evidence," J. Brau, Bill Francis and Ninon Kohers (Sutton), Journal of Business, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2003, pp. 583-612 .
• View harvest choice -M&A vs. IPO: 1996 M&A became more popular than IPO as harvest.
There is a discount for taking more liquidity (cash merger) • Dual track strategy cuts discount, in multivariate, don't need to go public same premium • "The Desire to Acquire and IPO Long-Run Underperformance," J. Brau, Rob Couch and Ninon Sutton, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 47, Issue 3, 2012, 493-510 .
• Acquirers -15.6% 3-year versus 5.9% non-acquirers 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 • Two SCOR papers and Three SB-2 papers • SCOR -no liquidity • SBs delist about twice S-1s.
• SB less time to go public but costs relatively more • Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance, Ed. Douglas Cumming, J. Brau, "Why Do Firms Go Public?" 2012, Chapter 15, 467-494.
• Can provide support for any number of reasons firms go public -not uniform. o Where Have All the IPOs Gone? Gao, Ritter, and Zhu, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2013. • Propose economies of scope hypothesis of selling out to larger firm to speed product to market. o Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, Rose and Solomon, Harvard Business Law Review, 2016.
• "The decline appears instead to be more attributable to the historical unsuitability of small firms for the public market." o The US Listing Gap, Doidge, Karolyi, Stulz, Journal of Financial Economics, 2017.
• High delist rate via acquisition accounts for 46% and low IPO rate 54%.
• Are there negative effects on investors, companies or capital markets as a result of any decrease in the number of IPOs or delays by companies in going public? o For example, are investors losing out on growth opportunities?
• Well-documented poor performance of IPOs, particularly small ones and non-VC backed ones beginning with Ritter (1991).
• Harvard Business Law Review paper consistent • Lose out on Skewness /Lottery-Mitton and Vorkink paper o Are companies getting the capital they need?
• Super cheap debt, private equity, and strategic buyouts seem to be providing sufficient capital. o Is the impact limited to small cap companies?
• Need to check stylized facts. o What is the impact on capital markets and efficient allocation of capital?
• Assuming regulation is not the main issue (as per academic studies) then this seems to be an example of market pressures.
• If there has been a sustained decrease in the number of U.S. IPOs, has it disproportionately impacted one portion of the stock market vs. the others? For example, small cap companies vs. large cap companies. If yes: o What are the major causes of this disproportionate impact?
• Harvard Business Law Review (Rose and Solomon, 2016) paper:
• "We therefore theorize that the decline in small IPOs appears to be more likely attributable to both demand-and supply-side transformations. In this scenario, small IPOs were being fed to market by forces that, because of regulatory and market changes (including the rise of online brokerages), are now in decline. Brokers were taking rents and creating an artificial supply of smaller companies that then languished in the market. Now that these supply-side forces are gone, the false supply is also gone. Coupled with a lack of demand predominantly due to the high failure rates and lack of growth for these firms, the market for small IPOs has reached equilibrium at a much lower level." • Poor market performance.
• Anecdotal -perception -regulation more onerous for small firms. o Is the reduced number of U.S. IPOs mostly caused by a slowdown in the creation of new, small cap private companies?
• My prior is most likely not. o What, if any, are the major negative consequences of the disproportionate impact?
• I'm not sure there are any for investors -performance on average sub par, seeking skewness probably not best strategy. o What, if anything, should be changed going forward to ameliorate this impact?
• I'm not convinced anything should be changed. Would require more direct study on optimal number (and size) of public firms. o Looking ahead, do you expect this trend to continue unless some material changes are made?
• Market forces should push the equilibrium to the closest thing to optimality. I expect capital to be allocated efficiently within current regulational context. • What recommendations would you propose in terms of policy, market structure, or other considerations?
o I feel more specific research is needed before any policy decisions should be made. The questions above are a great start of the type of questions that need to be researched.
A Chronology of Research by Jim Brau Pertaining to Factors that Impact the Number of IPOs
The rest of this document summarizes my own research on this topic over nearly 20 years of work.
The idea that the M&A market is an alternative to IPO for harvest "The Choice of IPO Versus Takeover: Empirical Evidence," J. Brau, Bill Francis and Ninon Kohers (Sutton), Journal of Business, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2003, pp. 583-612. Takeaway: The popularity of selling out surpassed IPO as exit strategy around 1996
Takeaway: In most cases IPOs earn a richer premium Takeaway: Liquidity risk is driving premium (at least in part).
The idea to ask CFOs why they choose to (or not to) do an IPO among other questions. Takeaway: The need for capital is not near the top.
Takeaway: Overall and industry conditions most important.
Takeaway: SEC reporting requirements only middle of pack and SOX near bottom.
The idea that a strategy can be used to help mitigate the discount to selling out vis-à-vis an IPO. Takeaway: SB-2 takes less time to go public but costs relatively more. (Not in tables.) Takeaway: SB-2's delist about double as much as S-1s.
Caveat: Due to lack of data we did not study SB-1 program.
The idea is to explore why do firms go public?
Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance, Ed. Douglas Cumming, J. Brau, "Why Do Firms Go Public?" 2012, Chapter 15, 467-494.
"Six months after he founded Netscape, Clark agitated for the company to go public. The company had few revenues, no profits, and a lot of new employees. No one else inside the company thought it should do anything but keep its head down and try to become a viable enterprise. "Jim was pressing for us to go public way before anyone else," recalls Marc Andreessen. It turned out there was a reason for this. He'd seen a boat called Juliet. He wanted one just like it, only bigger. To get it, he needed more money.
By then the decision was not Clark's alone to make. The company had hired a big-name CEO, Jim Barksdale, and had a proper board of directors. Barksdale didn't want to go public. He thought the company had enough problems trying to figure out how to turn a profit without having to explain itself to irate shareholders. But this time Clark had power, through his equity stake. He called a meeting to discuss the initial public offering (IPO), and stacked it with lawyers and bankers who stood to reap big fees from a public share offering and who were, as a result, enthusiastic about his initiative. At that meeting Barksdale finally capitulated. Eighteen months after Netscape was created, and before it had made a dime, Netscape sold shares in itself to the public. On the first day of trading the price of those shares rose from $12 apiece to $48. Three months later it was at $140. It was one of the most successful share offerings in the history of the US stock markets, and possibly the most famous.
There was only one explanation for its success: the market now saw the future through Clark's eyes. "People started drinking my Kool-Aid," says Clark … What the IPO did was give anarchy credibility." Lewis (2001) From Chapter Above: Summary of theories Having briefly discussed the leading theories on why firms go public, I now summarize here by listing each theory and the primary empirical predictions:
• Minimize cost of capital/Optimal capital structure: IPO firms will experience a decrease in their WACC after an IPO.
• To overcome borrowing constraints or increase bargaining power with banks: IPO firms will experience lower interest rates or less credit concentration after the IPO.
• Asymmetric Information/Pecking order of financing: IPO firms will offer public equity only after exhausting retained earnings and debt capacity.
• To establish a market price for subsequent sell-out: Frequent acquisitions of IPO firms will be observed in the after-market shortly after an IPO (e.g., [1] [2] [3] .
• As a tool to cash-out: IPO firms, especially those with VCs, will frequently include secondary shares in the IPO.
• To allow more dispersion of ownership: IPO firms will experience an increase in the ownership base after the IPO.
• Publicity/First-Mover Advantage: IPO firms will experience a significant increase in press coverage or other publicity during and after the IPO process.
• To create public market so the firm has the currency of shares for acquisitions: Many IPO firms will participate in the M&A market shortly after going public, especially as acquirers (to separate from the two-stage sell-out hypothesis).
• To create an analyst following: IPO firms will experience a favorable analyst following, on average.
• Windows of Opportunity: IPOs that issue during opportunistic windows will underperform after the IPO (e.g., 1, 3, 5 
years).
• Create shares for compensation: IPO firms will offer more stock-based compensation schemes after the IPO.
• Because other firms in the same industry have gone/Are going public: IPO firms will herd, particularly in industries.
• In Netscape's case, to buy a boat: Jim Clark will be able to buy his yacht after the IPO.
Since my study of finance began in grad school in 1994, I have always been intrigued with how much academic theory actually jives with what practitioners do on a daily basis. As such, financial surveys have always been of personal interest. While I was a doctoral student working on my dissertation, the idea of an IPO survey constantly nagged me. Graham and Harvey (2001) proved to me that it could be done, and Brau and Fawcett (2006a) was the result. Brau and Fawcett (2006a) has helped us to understand the motives of a sample of CFOs for conducting an IPO (among other questions), but it has not uncovered a definitive single answer for why firms go public. The contrast of the economic models of M&M and the reality of the opening quote about the Netscape IPO demonstrate corner solutions to the question of why firms go public. At least ten other theories fit in between these two endpoints.
Like traditional empirical studies, the survey evidence suggests that motives for going public vary far and wide, depending on the entrepreneur and firm. In this chapter I have summarized and organized the extant theories on why firms go public. Depending on the sample, method, intent, and perhaps desire of the researcher, all of the theories have been supported through argument and empirics at least once. Several theories are supported by one study and disputed by another. Within my own research, in fact, within one of my single papers, this has been the case. The researcher (and investor) is left to ask not which theory is correct, but which theories apply to which samples of firms that go public.
